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THE USE OF EXPERT PROOFS IN COMPLEX
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION IN NEW
YORK: A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF
VARYING FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE
APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE AND
ADMISSIBILITY
Steven J. Phillips*
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the beginning of this century, scientific and expert
evidence has presented vexing difficulties for the law.' These
difficulties, in no small measure, derive from fundamental
distinctions between legal, scientific, medical, and regulatory
processes, as well as from the cultures that support and inform
each of these activities.2
The legal system, employing an adversarial process to arrive at
"truth," is a normative process, which has as its goals the
prompt, cost effective, authoritative and final, as well as the just
resolutions of disputes. By contrast, science is an activity that
employs empirical analyses to discover "truth" as found in
* Steven J. Phillips obtained a B.A. from Williams College before obtaining
his J.D. at Columbia Law School. He is a member and the founding partner
of the firm Levy Phillips & Konigsberg. At Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, he is
trial and appellate counsel in mass tort litigation concerning personal injury,
wrongful death, property damage and economic loss resulting from
occupational and environmental exposures to toxic and other harmful
substances. He has participated in many notable civil trials and appellate
cases. He has also published works such as No HEROES No VILLIANS: THE
STORY of a MURDER TRIAL, RESISTING ARREST, AND CIvIL AcTIONS. The
author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Sheri E. Kanner, a law
student at New York University Law School.
I See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1901).
2 Peter H. Shuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (1993).
3 Id. at 15.
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verifiable phenomena.4 In this sense, science is an open-ended
descriptive process which cannot concern itself with how things
should be, but rather, with how they actually are. Accordingly,
concerns about justice or injustice are alien to the notion of
scientific inquiry.
The practice of medicine, while plainly informed by scientific
considerations, differs from science with respect to the problem
of timing. In science, all answers are by their nature tentative
and subject to further and future refinement. Practicing
physicians, on the other hand, confronted with actual patients and
medical emergencies have no such luxury.6 Differential
diagnoses must be achieved and action must be taken based upon
highly imperfect information and in an interactive manner.
Indeed, physicians' interventions themselves are constantly
changing to what is "true" concerning a patient's condition.7
Then again, in a regulatory or executive capacity, government
officials are faced with yet another set of problems in their fact-
finding and decision making processes These officials, charged
with responsibility to protect public welfare, and presented with
potential crises [e.g., a suspect product (breast implants) or a
possible environmental disaster (Three Mile Island)], must act
within tight time parameters, and must take into account
considerations of political and social acceptability in arriving at
their judgments and policies.9 Once again, "truth" as viewed
through this prism may look very different from the respective
"truths" of the scientist, jurist or the physician.
Finally, it must be recognized that there exists a host of other
professions or technological disciplines such as psychology,
engineering, human factors, industrial hygiene, and toxicology,
4 WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (9th ed. 1989).
5 See Shuck, supra note 2, at 1-5.6 Id. at 16.
7id.
8 1d. at 29.
9 See ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE, W.W. NORTON (1997). See also
Erikson, Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear, HARV. Bus.
REV. 118 (1990).
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all of which possess their own distinct methodologies and
rationales, and some of which may legitimately approach
comparable questions from different perspectives.
Against this broad background, in the recent past, our courts
have repeatedly been called upon in product liability mass tort
litigation to grapple with, and resolve, questions concerning the
admissibility and legal sufficiency of expert proofs bearing upon
questions of proximate causation, and in some instances, fault.
The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 10 has focused both the
scholarly and legal practice communities upon these concerns.
However, far from settling the manner in which these issues
should be resolved, Daubert and its progeny have, if anything,
prompted even greater debate and uncertainty. Indeed, it is not
surprising that on two occasions since the Daubert decision, the
Supreme Court has itself seen fit to return to aspects of this
general question."
Strictly speaking, Daubert concerns itself with the admissibility
of purportedly novel scientific proofs in areas which, depending
upon a litigator's perspective, might be characterized as other
"junk science" or as cutting edge technology in a fast changing
scientific world. 12 However, as the Supreme Court and other
tribunals have increasingly turned to address the expert proof
issue, and as the stakes have gone up, particularly in a mass tort
context, so-called Daubert issues have been raised in an ever
expanding number of contexts. Thus, while in earlier times,
reported decisions concerning novel scientific techniques were
largely limited to the domain of the criminal law, today a
dizzying number of such disputes are routinely raised in a wide
array of civil litigations.
In all events, a full appreciation of the role of expert proof in
mass tort personal injury litigation cannot be gleaned purely from
10 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
1 See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997); see also
Carmichael v. Sam Yang Tire Co., 131 F.3d 1433 (1lth Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
12 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
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high court decisions concerning the propriety of particular types
of scientific evidence and the formal methodology of determining
its admissibility. As a threshold matter, before these standards
even came into play, antecedent rules of pretrial disclosure
relating to anticipated expert proofs, as well as evidentiary
rulings concerning both the type and manner in which foundations
must be laid for expert proofs and opinions, play a critical role in
the manner in which these issues are framed and resolved.
In addition, a variety of separate practical considerations will
often operate at cross-purposes in this area. For instance,
concerns about excessive expense and the unfairness of imposing
upon poorer litigants the crushing burden of prolonged "expert"
discovery, followed by expensive and prolonged pretrial
hearings, followed only then by trial, can by themselves render
litigation unpalatable even where the science in question is not
particularly novel or controversial. Indeed, not only expense, but
also questions of delay and docket congestion are also implicated
when pretrial "Daubert" litigation becomes too commonplace or
protracted.
Of course, there is also the fundamental tension between the
role of the jury as a fact finder and assessor of credibility, and the
gatekeeper function of the trial court in making threshold
determinations of relevance and admissibility. Indeed, it is
certainly a matter of grave importance that courts not strip from
juries their role as fact finders by substituting the courts' own
judgments on the weight and credibility of disputed scientific
issues for those of juries under the guise of a Daubert
determination. Conversely, the fear that profound injuries and
the sympathy they engender, coupled with even frivolous science,
may move juries to unjust results, fuels the other side of the
debate.
In this context, legal practitioners in New York State who
litigate products liability, personal injury, wrongful death, and
property damage actions, especially in the toxic tort or mass tort
area, are often confronted with an interesting dichotomy in
prosecuting or defending these actions. Those cases adjudicated
in the federal forum proceed subject not only to the Daubert
decision, but also to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules
702 [Vol 15
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of Civil Procedure, as well as to the codified provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. By contrast, in New York State, as is
true in a large number of states, the Daubert holding has been
expressly rejected in favor of what is commonly known as the
Frye Rule. This was first enunciated, in 1923, by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Frye v. United States.'3 In addition, expert disclosure under the
New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules, as well as the case law
authority regarding New York's largely uncodified rules of
evidence, are in many respects quite different from those existing
in the Federal system.
Moreover, although there are important similarities between
New York State and Federal practice vis-a-vis expert proofs in
mass tort settings, there are also important substantive and
procedural distinctions. The purpose of this presentation is to
provide an overview of these similarities and distinctions as a
preface toward a later consideration of the relative merits of the
approach taken by each forum to these issues.
I. PRETRIAL DIscLosuRE CONCERNING EXPERT PROOFS
The contrast between the extent of pretrial disclosure
concerning anticipated expert testimony permitted in civil
litigation in Federal court as opposed to the New York State court
systems could not be greater. In the Federal system, wide
ranging and frequently redundant expert disclosure is either
mandated or broadly tolerated in the interest of permitting parties
to prepare fully both for all trial contingencies and for any
contemplated motion practice. This frequently occurs in
disregard of the expense and delay usually engendered by such
rounds of expert discovery. In sharp contrast, New York State
practice rather narrowly limits the extent of pretrial expert
disclosure, thereby minimizing, to some degree, both the delay
and the high transaction costs of the federal approach, albeit at
the price of rendering trial preparation less exhaustive.
13 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d
417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994).
1999 703
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For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 now requires
a written report, signed by an expert witness, containing
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or
support for the opinions; the qualifications of the
witnesses, including a list of all publications authored by
the witness within the preceding ten years; the
compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and
a listing of other cases in which the witness has testified
as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding
four years. [emphasis supplied] 4
In contrast, New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules Section
310115 merely requires a party's attorney to disclose "in
reasonable detail" the subject matter on which each expert is
expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on
which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifications of each
expert witness, and a summary of the grounds for each expert's
opinion. "
In addition, although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(A) now expressly permits parties to depose their
adversary's experts, and 26(b)(4)(B) may even permit depositions
or interrogatories directed at the opinions or factual knowledge of
non-testifying experts, C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(1)(iii) expressly forbids
such pretrial disclosure from an adversary's expert without court
order "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances," and even
then, "subject to restrictions as to scope . . . as the court may
deem appropriate . . . ." Accordingly, as existing case law
construing the C.P.L.R. has made clear, pretrial expert
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(B).
1' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(1)(i) (McKinney 1992).
16 See, e.g., Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 176 A.D.2d 700, 574 N.Y.S.2d 790
(2d Dep't 1991) (holding that a party need only supply substance of expert
opinions, and is not required to provide the fundamental factual information
relied upon).
[Vol 15
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disclosure beyond that permitted in a conventional C.P.L.R.
3101(d)(1)(i) statement is strongly disfavored and will rarely be
permitted. 17
The only other provisions of New York State law which may
directly bear upon the pretrial disclosure of expert materials in
civil contexts 18 appear as Rule 202.17 of the Uniform Rules
which governs the exchange of medical reports in personal injury
and wrongful death actions.' 9 Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule had
historically required a "detailed recital of injuries and conditions
as to which testimony will be offered at trial . . ." 10 However,
the newly amended rule, which went into effect on May 12,
1998, expanded its applicability from the reports of physicians to
that of all medical providers, and additionally deleted the term
"detailed" from the necessary recital. The purpose for this
deletion, as reflected in the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee to the Chief Administrator, was to spare plaintiffs the
escalating costs of obtaining medical reports from treating
physicians, reasoning that normal medical records and
administrative reports, such as no fault forms or Workers'
Compensation documents, would adequately identify the medical
conditions and diagnoses for which treating physicians had
rendered care, and, accordingly, about which they might give
testimony.1 Once again, the philosophy in New York State
practice has remained consistent as one of minimizing expenses
and avoiding the delays occasioned by the need to obtain written
and signed reports even where the amount of information thereby
made discoverable is diminished.22
"7 See, e.g., Venice v. Honeywell, Inc., 194 A.D.2d 442, 599 N.Y.S.2d 254
(1st Dep't 1993).
11 Specialized provisions concerning court-appointed experts in the context of
matrimonial and child custody cases are codified in Section 202.18 of the
Uniform Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court and are not
relevant to the instant discussion.
19 UNIFORM RULES Sup. CT. & COUNTY CT. § 202.17, as amended and
reported in N.Y.L.J., May 12, 1998 at 11, 12.
m Bert Bauman, Letter to Editor, Plaintiff's Bar Alerted On Medical Reports,
N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1998, at 2, col.6.
21 Id.
2 Id.
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II. ADMISSIONS, HEARSAY, AND OUT OF COURT EVIDENCE
To a significant degree, and in two separate regards, rules
concerning the admissibility of testimony in the form of
admissions, hearsay, or out of court evidence can greatly
influence the receipt of expert proof.
The first of these rules concerns statements, whether written or
oral, made by defendants regarding scientific and technical
matters at issue in a product liability litigation. It is well settled
as a legal matter, that large manufacturers of mass produced
products can be considered experts with respect not only to the
fabrication of these products but also with respect to their
potential effects. 23  Moreover, manufacturers are under a
common law and/or statutory duty to investigate and research the
potential hazards that might be associated with the use or
foreseeable misuse of their products.24 Accordingly, it is
commonplace for such parties to have in-house staff trained in
such diverse disciplines as Occupational Medicine, Industrial
Hygiene, Toxicology, Epidemiology, and Ergonomics. It is
equally commonplace for manufacturers acting either alone or
through trade associations to fund research and obtain outside
consultants to investigate and report back to them regarding
potential hazards associated with their products.
Against this background, it is important to recognize that
statements made by a party bearing upon a scientific question
may be received in evidence as an admission pursuant to either
F.R.E. 801(d)(2) or New York State laws, provided that the
statement was made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity, or by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or a statement by the
23 See George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990). See also
Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 274, 461 N.E.2d 864, 811, 473 N.Y.S.2d
378, 385 (1984); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d
571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976).
24 See, e.g., Lancaster Silo & Block v. Northern Propane, 75 A.D.2d 55,
427 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (4th Dep't 1980).
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party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment made during the existence of that
relationship.' It is important to note that under the Federal Rule,
the statement made will be admissible for the truth of the matter
stated, and is treated as an admission rather than hearsay,
regardless of whether or not the statement was against interest at
the time made.
Moreover, under both Federal and State court authorities,
statements made by nonparty manufacturers which might
otherwise be receivable for notice purposes [and not as hearsay],
to establish the state of the art or standards within an industry
[what a defendant manufacturer might have learned at a given
time through the exercise of due diligence], may also be received
in evidence for the truth of the matter, under a hearsay exception,
where the statement of the nonparty manufacturer was against
interest at the time made. 27  The point here, of course, is that
where a corporate defendant is a bona fide expert, its genuine
admissions, even on potentially controversial scientific issues,
will be admissible notwithstanding possible Daubert and Frye
considerations.
The second major area where hearsay considerations become
important relate to the bases or foundations for expert testimony.
It is no longer true either in Federal or in New York State
practice that the bases for an expert's opinion need all be received
in evidence as a prerequisite to providing the opinion testimony.
Both F.R.E. 705 and C.P.L.R. section 4515 expressly permit
experts to state their opinions without first specifying the facts or
data on which it is based." Of course, on cross-examination, an
' See Lowen v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 A.D.2d 534, 636
N.Y.S.2d 393 (2d Dep't 1996); See also, Loschiavo v. Port Authority, 58
N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983).
2 See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3).
27 Id. See also Basile v. Huntington Utilities Fuel Corp., 60 A.D.2d 616,
400 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 1977); In re Tremaine, 156 A.D.2d 862, 549
N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1989).
28 See FED. R. EviD. 705. See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4515. (McKinney
1992).
1999 707
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expert can be required to specify what those facts or data might
be.
Of even greater significance, is that, codified at F.R.E. 703, an
expert may rely upon information "'of a type' reasonably relied
by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence. "29
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Sugden,30 has
reached a comparable result. Moreover, in the recent case of
People v. Angelo,3' the Court of Appeals, while reiterating that
the expert witness may rely on "non record evidence only if it is
of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a
professional opinion,, 32 carefully stated that this common law
rule specifically incorporates the Frye requirement, that the non-
record evidence be of a type that is generally accepted as a matter
of procedure and methodology, as reliable within the scientific
community. 3
Finally, numbers of other hearsay exceptions may also be
mentioned in passing as bearing upon expert proof. For instance,
F.R.E. 803(18) expressly permits the use of learned treatises
when called to the attention of an expert witness either on direct
or on cross-examination.-' The excerpts of these treatises will be
received in evidence for the truth of the matter asserted provided
that they are simply read to the jury.35 They may not, however,
be received as physical exhibits.36
In New York State practice, an expert who acknowledges the
authoritativeness of a particular learned writing may likewise read
from that text to support his or her opinion, or can have such text
29 See FED. R. EvID. 703.
30 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974).
1 88 N.Y.2d 217, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 644 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1996).
32 Id. at 222, 666 N.E.2d at 1335, 644 NY.S.2d at 462.
33 Id. at 223, 666 N.E.2d at 1335, 644 NY.S.2d at 462. See also Hambsch
v. New York City Tr. Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 469 N.E.2d 516, 480 N.Y.S.2d
195 (1984).
34 See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
35 Id.
36 Id.
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read to him or her (provided that the authoritativeness of the text
is acknowledged) for impeachment purposes. However, unlike
the Federal practice, where assertions of authoritativeness by any
expert will be sufficient to bring the text into play as a hearsay
exception under F.R.E. 803(18), in State court practice, normally
the witness being questioned must acknowledge the
authoritativeness of the text. This latter distinction, however,
may be more fanciful than real, since once one expert has opened
the door by acknowledging a text, thereby getting the information
in the text into evidence, other experts will normally be subject to
cross-examination concerning that information, as it would
already be part of the trial record.
A final source of hearsay evidence which may be of profound
importance with respect to scientific disputes are government
reports. Findings by the Center for Disease Control, or OSHA,
or the National Transportation Safety Board, or the Surgeon
General or the FDA may all be enormously relevant to complex
product liability cases. F.R.E. 803(8) permits the receipt into
evidence of records, reports, statements, or data compilations in
any form of public offices or agencies.37 Similarly, New York
State precedents will permit such public records into evidence
provided that they possess sufficient independent indicia of
reliability.38
The various foregoing proofs illustrate graphically that there
exist a number of ways in which evidence may be obtained to
satisfy a court that a proffer of scientific proof should be received
in evidence, thereby buttressing what might otherwise be the
mere ipse dixit of the proposed expert.
1I. THE DAUBERT DECISION
As most practitioners are by now well aware, the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert overruled the so-called "general
37 See FED. R. Evm. 803(8).
38 See, e.g., Cramer v. Kuhn, 213 A.D.2d 131, 630 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep't
1985); See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4520 (McKinney 1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 10 (McKinney 1998).
1999
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acceptance test" of Frye v. United States,39 and held that in
Federal jurisprudence, the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence had substituted a new standard in place of the Frye
test.4" Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
accordingly now the point of departure for an understanding of
this issue in the Federal forum.
Under F.R.E. 702, scientific evidence must "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 41
This requirement has been generally interpreted by the Daubert
Court as mandating that the scientific evidence in question be
relevant, or alternatively, to use a term first coined by Judge
Becker in the Third Circuit, that there be "fit" between the
proffered testimony and the issue to be determined by the fact
finder.42
Separate and distinct from the question of relevancy is the issue
of the reliability of the proffered expert testimony. In serving a
gatekeeper role with regard to questions of reliability, the
Daubert Court identified a number of exclusive factors that might
be considered by a court. These included:
1. falsifiability [whether the theory or technique in
question could be or has been tested];
2. whether the theory or technique has been subject to
peer review and publication;
3. the known or potential rate of error of the scientific
technique; and
4. whether the theory is subject to "general acceptance.,43
39 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40 Daubert v. Merell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41 See FED. R. EvID. 702.
42 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742-43 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 513 U.S. 1190
(1995).
43 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. In Paoli, the Third Circuit added the
following three considerations to the four Daubert factors:
(1) the relationship of the preferred methodology to other techniques which
have been established as reliable;
(2) the qualifications of the preferred expert to testify on the methodology at
issue; and
710 [Vol 15
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In considering these factors, the Court was careful to instruct that
the focus must be solely on principles and methodology, and not
on the conclusions that they generated.44
On the face of the matter, it would appear that the Daubert
decision greatly liberalized the process of admitting expert proofs
into evidence. In practice, however, five years after Daubert, a
debate still continues over who won and who lost under the
decision, and there is considerable doubt as to whether or not, in
practice, Federal courts have behaved any differently under
Daubert than they did under the old Frye test.
In the recent decision General Electric Co. v. Joiner,45 the
United States Supreme Court determined that admissibility
decisions under Daubert are for a trial judge to make, and that
such decisions may only be reviewed by appellate courts on an
abuse of discretion standard.46 As a consequence of the Joiner
decision, District Judges are vested with enormous discretion in
interpreting Daubert, and most practitioners in the Federal forum
appreciate that widely divergent results may be obtained based
upon the predilections of the particular trial court. As Justice
Stevens recognized in his partial concurrence and partial dissent
in Joiner,47 the same proof which the district court in that case
deemed insufficient by the trial court under Daubert would have
been upheld by the Supreme Court had the district court elected,
in the exercise of its discretion, to receive the proffered testimony
into evidence.48
To further complicate the Daubert picture and Federal
jurisprudence, considerable doubt now exists as to whether the
Daubert criteria, which are phrased in terms of what can be
described as hard science, may also be applied to other types of
technical expertise. Presently pending before the United States
(3) whether the method has been developed independently of litigation. Paoli,
35 F.3d at 742.
" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
41 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
46 Id. at 517.
47id.
48 Id. at 521-22 (Stevens, J., concurring/dissenting).
1999
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Supreme Court is Carmichael v. Sam Yang Tire Co., a case in
which the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision,
precluding testimony on Daubert grounds, of a technical expert
with experience in determining the cause of tire failures in
automobiles." The Circuit Court reasoned that the Daubert
criterion made little sense in the context of evaluating the
admissibility of experts whose experience was garnered from a
professional career of investigating tire failures, rather than from
the pursuit of some academic, scientific discipline. Presumably,
the Supreme Court will, in the immediate future, shed further
light on this subject. For now, however, it would appear that in
the Federal forum there is relatively little certainty available in
this field.
Another Federal development, albeit not strictly speaking
addressed by the Daubert decision, has been the use, most
particularly in the context of the silicone breast implant litigation,
of court appointed panels pursuant to F.R.E. 706. The purpose
of these panels is to obtain a "neutral" assessment by court
appointed experts of proffered scientific proofs. The power of
the court to appoint such expert panels is well established and
may assist the court and possibly juries in grappling with difficult
scientific concepts and in promoting settlement.5'
One example of the actual use of a panel is reported in Hall v.
Baxter Health Care Corp.52 In that case, the district court, acting
pursuant to F.R.E. 104 (rather than F.R.E. 706), appointed a
panel of technical advisors in four apparently appropriate fields. 3
After a hearing at which the parties could be heard, the technical
advisors submitted reports and gave counsel on both sides the
opportunity to question the experts." Thereafter, the court
determined that the proffered scientific proofs would not be
49 131 F.3d 1433 (1lth Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd.
v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
50 Id. at 1437.
5' See e.g., In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 982
F.2d 721, 750 (2d Cir. 1992).
52 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
i Id. at 1392-93.
4 Id. at 1393.
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received into evidence.55 In the multi-district consolidation of the
breast implant cases, the District Court presiding over some
20,000 of these cases, has likewise appointed a panel, but did so
pursuant to F.R.E. 706.56 Likewise, in the asbestos litigation,
and more particularly in the context of the Johns Mansville
bankruptcy, the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein appointed a panel
of experts to address the variety of knotty problems associated
with that proceeding.57
There does not appear to exist any statutory or common law
authority under New York State practice that would permit the
appointment of such a panel in a state court proceeding.5
Although the concept of a court appointed panel has an obvious
appeal, especially in the peculiar circumstances of a nationwide
mass tort situation where genuine Daubert issues obviously exist,
the practical problems entailed in constituting such a panel and
the expense and delay that would obviously result from such a
practice, militate against its use, except under extraordinary
circumstances.
IV. THE FRYE RULE AS APPLIED BY THE NEW YORK
COURTS
The seminal case addressing the standards for the admissibility
of scientific proofs in supposedly novel areas is Frye v. United
51 Id. at 1402-03.
56 It is worth noting that the Hall court, mentioned above, has decided to wait
for the report of the national panel before finalizing its decision. Id. at 1394-
95. The report of this panel was published as this article was going to press.
5' In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993); Findley v. Falise (In re Joint Eastern and Southern
Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir.), aff'd without op., 100 F.3d 944
(2d Cir. 1996).
" The analogous practice in the medical malpractice arena of having a
neutral panel of a judge, a lawyer, and a physician evaluate medical
malpractice claims was enacted by the New York legislature, and then repealed
several years later when, in practice, it proved to be time consuming and
expensive without materially assisting in the resolution of malpractice cases.
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States.59 In Frye, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a trial
court decision to exclude, in a criminal case, a defendant's
proffer of scientific proof concerning a systolic blood pressure
deception test, a primitive form of the polygraph.' Holding that
the test had not yet gained the requisite standing and recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities to justify
expert testimony based upon such a test, the Court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and
while the courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing form
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field to which it belongs.61
The New York Court of Appeals formally embraced the Frye
standard fifteen years after that standard was first enunciated. 62
9 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60Id.
61 Id. at 1014.
62 See People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). New York has
since used the Frye standard to determine the admissibility of scientific
testimony based on polygraph examinations (People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511,
255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969); People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4
N.Y.S.2d 913 (Kings County Ct. 1938); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938)), voiceprint analysis (People v.
Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1978);
People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1976)), hypnosis (People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 2077,
557 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1990); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d
484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983)), DNA testing (People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d
417, 633 N.E.2d 541, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994); People v. Castro, 144 Misc.
2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989)), drug influence
tests (People v. Quinn, 153 Misc. 2d 139, 580 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1991)), electrophoresis (People v. Seda, 139 Misc. 2d 834,
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The principal Court of Appeals decision addressing the question
of the receipt into evidence of possibly novel scientific proof is
People v. Wesley.63 In Wesley, the Court of Appeals, while
noting the existence of Daubert, expressly declined to adopt that
decision, and explicitly re-embraced the Frye standard. In
explaining itself, the Wesley court expressly noted that Frye itself
acknowledged the willingness of courts to "go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized
scientific principle," 64 and also recognized that the methodology
or principle at issue need not be universally endorsed so long as it
is generally accepted as reliable.6 Moreover, both Wesley and
Frye make plain that the inquiry on "general acceptance" must be
addressed to the relevant scientific community, but left to the trial
court the determination on a case by case basis of what that
community might be.
In all events, once the Frye general acceptance inquiry has been
resolved, the Wesley court explained that the second step for the
court became a routine evaluation of whether there was an
appropriate trial foundation for the admissibility of the specific
evidence advanced. 66 Such inquiry might concern itself with
chains of custody and the like, or proof that the specific
procedures followed in the particular case were of the type
determined to have met the general reliability test. In this context
529 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1988)), rape trauma syndrome
(People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.3d 883
(1990); Gutierrez v. Iulo, 156 Misc. 2d 79, 591 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1992)), acute grief syndrome (People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d
681, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992)), psychological factors
regarding witness perception and memory (People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827,
559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990)), neonaticide syndrome (People
v. Wernick, 89 N.Y.2d 111, 674 N.E.2d 322, 651 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1996)),
spinocope tests (Castrichini v. Rivera, 669 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. CE. Monroe
County 1997)), and identification through bite marks (People v. Middleton. 54
N.Y.2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 100 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981)).
I People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 541, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1994).
64 Id. at 422-23, 633 N.E.2d at 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
65 d. at 423, 633 N.E.2d at 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
66Id. at 428-29, 633 N.E.2d at 457, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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also, the reliance upon data of the type traditionally relied upon
by experts in the field comes into play, since non-record evidence
and data may now expressly be used by experts.
Finally, after the Frye test has been satisfied and the proper
foundation laid for the admissibility of the scientific proof, it is
left to the jury, as a fact finder, to weigh credibility and consider
possible infirmities in the collection and analysis of data. 67
In addressing the Frye general acceptance question, it is also
clear that a Frye hearing is not mandatory and that a trial court
may receive novel scientific proof without resorting to a full
fledged hearing.68  For instance, objections to either trial
foundation or the weight of evidence must plainly be addressed at
the time of trial.6 9 Moreover, general acceptance of scientific
principles may be shown through appropriate writings and even
judicial opinions, thereby rendering a Frye hearing unnecessary
on that basis as well.70
With respect to the question of the burden of proof relating to
proffers of novel scientific expert testimony, the onus in the first
instance is upon the party resisting the evidence to voice objection
to the proffer, and to make some showing that a Frye inquiry is
called for. Thereafter, it would appear to be the burden of the
party offering the proof to establish that the Frye test had been
met.
Most likely, in civil litigation, and indeed even in criminal
litigation, it would appear that the party proffering the proof must
meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. 7' However,
there even exists authority for the proposition that the standard
for admissibility is merely the existence of credible evidence that
67 Id. at 429, 633 N.E.2d at 458, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
68 Id. at 426, 633 N.E.2d at 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 102; See also People v.
Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981);In re
Lahey v. Kelly, 71 N.Y.2d 135, 518 N.E.2d 924, 524 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1987).
69 Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 426, 633 N.E.2d at 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 102;
People v. Serrano, 219 A.D.2d. 508, 631 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 1995).
70 Lahey, 71 N.Y.2d 135, 518 N.E.2d 924, 524 N.Y.S.2d 30; People v.
Morales, 227 A.D.2d 648, 643 N.Y.S.2d 217 (2d Dep't 1996).
"' See, e.g., In re M.Z., 155 Misc. 2d 564, 590 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1992).
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the Frye standard has been met, rather than the preponderance of
the evidence standard, since the credibility question involved in
weighing the evidence should be expressly left to the jury. 7,
In all events, it would appear that in New York State practice,
the problems of dealing with expert proofs, both from a
substantive and procedural perspective, are somewhat more
settled than in Federal practice. Generally speaking, trial courts
deal with such issues in the context of trial proceedings and do so
efficiently and with a minimal of expense and delay. It might
also be added, in this respect, that in New York State appellate
practice, the Appellate Divisions expressly possess the ability to
review the fact-finding of the trial court whether in this Frye
context or otherwise, and thus can impose a greater uniformity
and predictability in this area than exists in the Federal forums in
the wake of the Joiner decision.
CONCLUSION
Although New York State and Federal forums individually
profess to a liberal approach toward the receipt of novel scientific
proofs relying upon "traditional standards of relevancy" rather
than specialized tests, plainly there are significant differences
both substantively and procedurally in the manner in which the
two systems address this issue.73 Presently, notwithstanding the
considerable effort and commentary that has occurred in the
federal system over this issue in the wake of the Daubert
decision, it may well be that New York State practice in this area
is, practically, a superior approach to the problem by virtue of its
more streamlined and cost conscious approach, as well as the
greater certainties that currently exist with its substantive and
procedural law.
I See In re Meyer, 132 Misc. 2d 415, 504 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Fain. Ct. Kings
County 1986) (received into evidence polygraph proof in a child custody
proceeding).
7' See Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 426, 633 N.E.2d at 456, 611 N.Y.S..2d at 102;
see also Daubert v. Merell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Obviously, at this point, it is not possible to make more than
preliminary observations concerning the disparities that presently
exist between New York and Federal law in this volatile area.
Only the future can determine whether the disparate approaches
now in place in the two forums will yield disparate outcomes.
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